We address the problem to control a population of noncooperative heterogeneous agents, each with strongly convex cost function depending on the average population state, and all sharing a convex constraint, towards a competitive aggregative equilibrium. We assume an information structure through which a central controller has access to the average population state and can broadcast control signals for steering the decentralized optimal responses of the agents. We propose a dynamic control law that, based on monotone operator theory arguments, ensures global convergence to an equilibrium independently on the problem data, that are the cost functions and the constraints, local and global, of the agents.
Related literature: Whenever the behavior of each agent is affected by some aggregate effect of all the agents, which is a typical feature of the mentioned application domains, rather than by agent-specific one-to-one effects, aggregative games [16] , [17] , [18] , [19] offer the fundamentals to analyze the strategic interactions between each individual agent and the entire population, although in the classic literature the analysis is limited to agents with scalar decision variable.
For large, in fact infinite, population size, aggregative game setups have been considered as mean field games among agents with quadratic cost functions and unconstrained vector decision variable, both in the deterministic [20] and in the stochastic case [21] . Unlike classic aggregative and mean field games, in this paper we are interested in generalized aggregative games for a large population of agents with general convex functions, constrained vector decision variable [22] , [23] , and in addition with convex shared (i.e., coupling) constraints.
Generalized games, that is, games among agents with shared constraints [24] , [25] , have been widely studied in the last decade within the operations research community [26] , [27] and the control systems one [28] , [29] , [30] , [31] in relation with duality theory and variational inequalities.
Assessing the convergence of the dynamic interactions among the noncooperative agents towards an equilibrium is one main challenge that arises in (generalized) games. With this aim, best response dynamics and fictitious play with inertia, i.e., gradient update dynamics, have been analyzed and designed, respectively, both in discrete [32] , [33] and continuous time setups [34] , [35] . In particular, fictitious play with inertia has been introduced to overcome the typical non-convergence issue of the best response dynamics [34] . The common feature of these methods is that the agents dynamically implement sufficiently small gradient-type steps, each along the direction of optimality for their local problem. Thus, the noncooperative agents need to agree on the sequence of step sizes, and in addition to exchange truthful information, e.g. with neighboring players, to update their local descent directions. Several distributed algorithms have been proposed for computing the game equilibria, see [36] , [37] , [38] , [39] , [40] and the references therein.
Originality: Differently from distributed approaches, in this paper we consider aggregative games among noncooperative agents that do not exchange information, nor agree on variables affecting their local behavior, with the other (competing) agents. Along the lines in [10] , [23] For large population size, we wish to control the decentralized optimal responses of the agents towards a competitive aggregative equilibrium, that is, a set of agent strategies that are feasible for both the local and the shared constraints, and individually optimal for each agent, given the strategies of all other agents and some penalty signal associated with the shared constraint.
We aim at a competitive equilibrium rather than a Nash equilibrium since in several classes of generalized games the former is more efficient than the latter, in the sense that the (clearing) cost functions and constraints coupled together in aggregative form.
• We show that the agents' decentralized optimal responses to their average gets arbitrarily close to a competitive equilibrium as the population size grows.
• We discover a nontrivial multivariable mapping with the following two fundamental properties:
1. its unique zero is the incentive signal that generates, via the agents' decentralized optimal responses, the desired equilibrium;
2. there exists a Hilbert space in which the mapping reads as the sum of two monotone operators.
Therefore, splitting methods are applicable for computing the zero of such mapping in a semi-decentralized fashion.
• We design a dynamic control law with global convergence guarantee for steering the agents' decentralized optimal responses to the desired equilibrium, with minimal information structure, and with no assumption on the problem data, other than strong convexity.
• We apply our approach to congestion control in shared networks and demand side management in the smart grid, generalizing the literature results.
For establishing global convergence with minimal information structure, we build upon mathematical tools from variational and convex analysis [41] , and monotone operator theory [42] .
Technically, we go beyond the literature results, where the cost functions are assumed to be strongly convex quadratic and/or there is no coupling constraint [22] , [23] . Preliminary versions of some technical results in this paper are in [43] , [44] . Specifically, in [43] no coupling constraint is considered, while in [44] the cost functions are assumed to be strongly convex quadratic. In addition, the class of control laws proposed therein are different from that in this paper; the latter allow us to postulate no assumption on the problem data, other than strong convexity.
Also, applications are not illustrated in [43] , [44] .
Paper organization: Sections II, III define the aggregative game, the competitive equilibrium and its approximation with an appropriate fixed point. Section IV presents the novel dynamic control law. The main technical results are shown in Section V and discussed in Section VI.
Section VII illustrates the proposed approach via numerical simulations. Section VIII concludes the paper and points at several research opportunities. Some proofs are provided in the Appendix.
DRAFT
Basic notation: R, R >0 , R ≥0 respectively denote the set of real, positive, and non-negative real numbers; R := R ∪ {∞}; N denotes the set of natural numbers; for a,
denotes the block diagonal matrix with A 1 , . . . , A M in block diagonal positions; given scalars a 1 , . . . , a M , we use the notation vec (a i )
With S n we denote the set of symmetric n × n matrices; for a given Q ∈ S n , the notations Q 0 (Q 0) and Q ∈ S n 0 (Q ∈ S n 0 ) denote that Q is symmetric and has positive (non-negative) eigenvalues. I denotes the identity matrix; 0 (1) denotes a matrix/vector with all elements equal to 0 (1); to improve clarity, we may add the dimension of these matrices/vectors as subscript. A ⊗ B denotes the Kronecker product between matrices A and B. Every mentioned set S ⊆ R n is meant to be nonempty.
Operator theory notations and definitions: H Q , with Q ∈ S n 0 , denotes the Hilbert space R n with inner product x, y Q := x Qy and induced norm x Q := x Qx, for all x, y ∈ R n ; we refer to the Hilbert space H I whenever not specified otherwise. Given a function f :
Q for all x, y ∈ R n ; it is firmly nonexpansive (hence monotone and nonexpansive
for all x, y ∈ dom(f ) [23, Lemma 5] ; it is β-cocoercive (hence monotone), where β ∈ R >0 , if the mapping β f (·) is firmly nonexpansive.
DRAFT II. THE COMPETITIVE AGGREGATIVE GAME
We consider a population of N 1 competitive agents, where each agent i ∈ N[1, N ] has strategy (i.e., decision variable) x i ∈ X i ⊂ R n , and all share the constraint
for some set S ⊆
We assume that each agent i ∈ N[1, N ] aims at minimizing its local cost function, which depends on the average among the strategies of all other agents, and specifically at computing
where the vector p ∈ R n represents the penalty associated with the coupling constraint in (1).
Formally, x i in (2) is a best response of agent i to the strategies of the other agents, given the penalty vector p. 
Standing Assumption 2: Strongly convex cost functions. For all i ∈ N[1, N ], the cost function
for some f i : R n → R continuous and -strongly convex on dom(f i ) ⊆ X i , ∈ R >0 , and
Remark 1: It follows from the fact that dom(
Our goal is to control the strategies of the agents within a competitive aggregative equilibrium, that is, a set of strategies and penalty vector such that: the coupling constraint in (1) is satisfied, DRAFT and each agent's strategy is optimal given the penalty vector and the strategies of all other agents, see [12, Definition 1] for a definition of competitive equilibrium with linear coupling constraints.
,p is a competitive aggregative ε-equilibrium, ε ∈ R ≥0 , for the game in (2) with shared constraint in (1) if
i ∈ X i and
It is a competitive aggregative equilibrium for the game in (2) with shared constraint in (1) (4) holds with ε = 0.
Proposition 1: Existence of a competitive aggregative equilibrium. There exists a competitive aggregative equilibrium for the game in (2) with shared constraint in (1).
Proof: See Appendix A.
III. FIXED POINTS OF THE AGGREGATION MAPPING
Differently from typical game theoretic setups, we assume that an agent i cannot exchange information on the strategies of all other (competing) agents, which challenges the computation of an equilibrium especially for large population size. Instead, we assume that each individual agent responds optimally to incentive signals (σ, λ) ∈ R n × R n that enter as second argument of the cost functions in (3) and as penalty vector, respectively, according to the information structure in Figure 1 . Formally, for all i ∈ N[1, N ], we define the agent's optimal response
and the aggregation mapping A :
Then we note that, ifσ = A σ,λ for someλ ∈ R n , and we introduce the shorthand notation
i is the second argument of J i in the left-hand side of (4), and an O(1/N ) approximation of the second argument of J i in the right-hand side of (4). Thus, let us formalize next that a pair (
,λ is in fact a competitive aggregative ε-equilibrium.
DRAFT
Proposition 2: Existence of a fixed point. There exists
Proof: See Appendix B.
Theorem 1: Fixed point generates a competitive aggregative ε-equilibrium.
is such thatσ = A σ,λ as defined in (6), then the pair (
, with x i as in (5) for all i ∈ N[1, N ], is a competitive aggregative ε N -equilibrium for the game in (2) with shared constraint in (1), where lim N →∞ ε N = 0; in addition, if the functions
Proof: See Appendix C.
Theorem 1 states that, in the limit of infinite population size, a competitive aggregative equilibrium is generated by the agents' optimal responses to any pair (σ,λ) such thatσ is a fixed point of A ·,λ in S.
IV. DYNAMIC CONTROL OF THE DECENTRALIZED OPTIMAL RESPONSES
In view of Theorem 1, for large population size we can control the agents' optimal responses, e.g. via dynamic updates of their two arguments, to a set of strategies whose average is a fixed point of the aggregation mapping (with respect to the first argument) within the shared constraint set. Informally speaking, the objective is to find a pair of arguments (σ,λ) such that σ = A(σ,λ) = x 0 , for some x 0 ∈ S. With this aim, in this section we translate the problem into that of finding a zero of an appropriate multivariable mapping via semi-decentralized iterations.
A. From fixed points to zeros
We start by defining the mapping
In this way, a pair σ,λ ∈ R n × R n satisfiesσ = A σ,λ = x 0 (σ,λ) ∈ S if and only if DRAFT σ;λ ∈ R 2n is a zero of the mapping Θ :
where K 0 is a matrix gain to be chosen, and we defined the matrix M ∈ R 2n×2n and the
B. Dynamic control as zero finding algorithm
In general, computing a zero of a multivariable nonlinear mapping such as Θ = M +Γ in (8) is a challenging task. However, for the sum of monotone mappings there exist iterative algorithms with global convergence guarantee [42, Chapter 25] . Inspired by the forward-backward algorithm [42, Equation 25 .26], we propose the dynamic control law κ in ( * ) for computing a zero of
In ( * ), > 0 is sufficiently small and the sequence (α t ) ∞ t=0 is chosen as follows. Design choice 1: The sequence (α t ) ∞ t=0 in ( * ) is such that α t ∈ (0, 3/2) for all t ∈ N and
Note that α t =ᾱ ∈ (0, 3/2), and α t =ᾱ/(t + 1), for all t ∈ N, satisfy the design condition stated above. Let us summarize the dynamic control scheme in Algorithm 1.
DRAFT

Algorithm 1: Dynamic control of competitive optimal responses
Initialization: t ← 0;
Iterate until convergence:
• The controller broadcasts
to all agents, and computes x 0 σ (t) , λ (t) from (7).
• The agents compute in parallel
• The controller receives A σ (t) , Kλ (t) as in (6), computes Γ [σ (t) ; λ (t) ] from (9), and from ( * )
V. GLOBAL CONVERGENCE
A. Statement of the main results
The mapping Θ in (8) reads as the sum of the linear, hence continuous, mapping M and the mapping Γ in (9) . With the aim of applying [42, Theorem 25.8] , in the following we show that by choosing the matrix gain K in (5) appropriately, M is monotone and Γ is β-cocoercive, that is, β Γ(·) is firmly nonexpansive, in some Hilbert space. Consequently, we derive a dynamic control law that ensures global convergence of the controlled decentralized optimal responses to a set of strategies whose average is a fixed point of the aggregation mapping with respect to its first argument, as desired.
Theorem 2: Monotonicity. Under design choice 2, the linear mapping M in (9) is monotone in H P , and the mapping Γ in (9) is β-cocoercive and strictly monotone in H P , where 
We proceed with two statements that are exploited later on. 
for all v ∈ ∂f (ξ), w ∈ ∂f (ζ). In particular, since (∂f ) −1 is everywhere single-valued, for all
y ∈ ∂f (ζ), and hence (x − y) (∂f )
Lemma 2: Let the function f : R n → R be -strongly convex, ∈ R >0 . Then for any A ∈ R n×m , the mapping
is ( A / )-Lipschitz continuous. 
for all z ∈ R n ; Equation (11) follows by applying (∂f ) −1 to both sides of the last inclusion.
It follows from Lemma 2 that, for all i ∈ N[1, N ], the optimal response from (5) reads as
and analogously, the mapping x 0 in (7) reads as
where f 0 (y) := 1 2 y y + δ S (y).
In view of Γ in (9), for all i ∈ N[1, N ], let us define the mapping Proof: Since M is γ-cocoercive, for all x, y ∈ R m :
We now apply Lemma 3 to the mapping Γ i (·) in (13) . Namely, we consider m = 2n and the
and derive
where > 0 is chosen such that C + (1 − )K 0.
Since
0 and C ∈ S n , K 0 and C + K 0 ensure that B is invertible and
where A − B = P and /( A 2 P ) = /((3 + 2 √ 2) P ) ≥ /(6 P ) =: β in (10). In turn, 
in (13) Proof: As M is (strictly) monotone, for all x = y ∈ R m :
VI. DISCUSSION
A. Features of the dynamic control algorithm
One computational feature of the iteration in ( * ) is that it only requires one-to-all coordination between a central controller and the decentralized, hence parallelizable, optimal responses
in (5) of the agents, as shown in Algorithm 1. Each decentralized computation consists in solving a finite dimensional strongly convex optimization problem, for which efficient algorithms are available [45] , [47] . Note that at each iteration t only two vectors in R n are broadcast, independently on the population size N , which can be arbitrarily large. Also note that the controller needs access to the aggregate information A only, not necessarily to the entire set of optimal responses. The main distinctive feature of the proposed architecture is that the central controller can decide on the step sizes (α t ) ∞ t=0 and , as well as on the stopping criterion for the DRAFT iteration in ( * ). Therefore, the agents can simply behave as fully noncooperative, in the sense that in addition to being self-interested, they do not have to exchange information with each other, nor to agree on the step sizes associated with some coordination signal, nor on the stopping criterion. Each of these agreement points would be in fact exposed to malicious agent behavior.
Finally note that, for the convergence of the dynamic interactions, neither the central controller nor the agents need to know the population size N .
B. Dynamic control as fixed point iteration
The iteration in ( * ) reads as a fixed point iteration . Therefore, T is the composition of two firmly nonexpansive mappings, which implies that it is nonexpansive. Some fixed point iterations with global convergence guarantee are known for nonexpansive operators [48] . Among others,
we mention the Krasnoselskij iteration [23, Equation (18) (20)]. The former corresponds to the design choice α t :=ᾱ ∈ (0, 1) for all t ∈ N, while the latter to choosing a sequence (α t ) ∞ t=0 such that ∞ t=0 α t = ∞, e.g. α t := 1/(t + 1).
VII. APPLICATIONS
The aggregative game setup in Sections II-III is applicable to the dynamic management of noncooperative agents. Applications include network congestion control [13] , demand response DRAFT in competitive markets [12] and demand side management for large populations of prosumers in the smart grid, e.g. residential loads with coupling constraints [3] , [49] , and smart homes with shared renewable energy sources [50] . The common feature of all these setups is in fact the presence of a population of competitive agents with convex cost functions, convex local and shared constraints, coupled together in aggregative form as in (1)-(2). In the next subsections we focus on two such applications.
A. Congestion control with network capacity constraints
We consider the problem faced by a network manager to control the flow demands of a large set of noncooperative users by dynamically pricing the network capacity [13] . experienced by the users over the edges, and p ∈ R n is the congestion price, that is, the penalty vector associated with the shared network-capacity constraint
Each user i also has a local constraint set X i that represents its individual routing policy per flow unit.
Illustrative scenario with fixed routing policy: In the following, we simulate the scenario illustrated in [13, Section IV.B], where fixed routing policies are considered. Namely, each agent i has a routing policy x i = a i ξ i , for some scalar ξ i ≥ 0, and some fixed vector a i ∈ R n such that 0 n ≤ a i ≤ 1 n . As in [13, Section IV.B], for each user i, we use the convex, non-quadratic, The pair σ (t) , λ (t) generated as in ( * ) converges to the zero [σ;λ] of the mapping Θ in
Affine approximation of the delay cost: Next we derive an affine approximation for the delay 
Note that the matrix diag (N/β Table I , columns [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] . We tune the gains of the dynamic control law κ in ( * ) as α = 0.99, K = 0.5I n , and choose satisfying the design choice 3. Finally, we set as convergence criterion that both σ (t) − A(σ (t) , Kλ (t) ) and x 0 (σ (t) ), Kλ (t) ) − A(σ (t) , Kλ (t) ) must be less than 10 −2 . Figure 2 shows a representative converging scenario. Next we check the effect of the affine approximation of the delay cost mapping. First, we compute the pair (σ,λ) as limit point of ( * ), with c(·) as in (17) . Then, for each user i we consider the cost in (15) of its strategȳ
DRAFT we compare this cost against the best achievable value, having fixed the strategies of all the other agents and the penalty vector, i.e., J
Precisely, we compute the highest possible cost increase among all the users, relative to the best cost function value, i.e., ε rel :
as a result, we obtain a numerical value that is less than 0.02%.
B. Charging control for plug-in electric vehicles with transmission line constraints
We consider the problem to control the charging schedule of a large population of plug-in electric vehicles subject to transmission line constraints [51] , [52] . taken from [53] , and then are randomized as in [11] to emulate the population variability. For with uniform distribution. Further, we consider the normalized charging constraints Coupling constraints: We extend the setup in [11] with time-varying transmission line con- (16) [51, Equation (13) Numerical simulations: We tune the gains of the dynamic control law in ( * ) as α = 0.99, K = 0.05I n , and then choose according to the design choice 3. For randomly taken values of the parameters, Figure 3 shows the sum between the normalized average inflexible demand and the average among the charging strategies at the equilibrium, i.e., the optimal responses in (5). Figure 4 in log-log scale shows a representative converging scenario. Finally, we compute the relative difference between the best cost function value and the cost at the
, and
Already for N = 5 we obtain a maximum relative difference ε rel that is less than 0.03%.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have addressed the problem to control a large population of competitive agents, with strongly convex cost functions coupled together via the average population state, convex local and coupling constraints, towards a competitive aggregative equilibrium. 
, and x 0 (σ (t) , λ (t) ) converge toσ = A(σ,λ) ∈ S.
no assumption on the problem data, other than strong convexity and compactness. The numerical simulations show that the proposed algorithm achieves an almost competitive aggregative equilibrium within a small number of iterations.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Proposition 1
For any σ := σ 1 ; . . . ; σ N ∈ R nN , we consider the optimization problem
where Since P(σ) from (18) has a separable convex cost function and the linear coupling constraint We now define x 1 ; . . . ;x N := x (σ) andp := λ σ , so that at convergence (i.e., as t → ∞) by (19b) we havex i = arg min y∈X i J i y, 
,p is a competitive aggregative equilibrium for the game in (2) with shared constraint in (1).
B. Proof of Proposition 2
Similarly to the proof of Proposition 1, for any σ ∈ S, we consider the optimization problem
where
y y + N σ y + δ S (y), and for all i ∈ N[1, N ], J i is as in (3), hence dom(
. . . ; x N (σ) be the optimizer of P(σ) in (20) , and consider the optimal aggregation mapping A : R n → R n as 
Finally we note that, for all i ∈ N[1, N ], the optimal response mapping x i in (5) is such that We first show that, for any givenλ ∈ R n , the set of optimal responses (x i (σ,λ)) N i=1 to σ,λ such thatσ = A σ,λ gets arbitrarily close to a set of best responses. 
Thus, for all i, we derive that 
